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This thesis surveys various methods for modeling land
combat and examines the assumptions underlying each method.
The users of land combat models are identified according to
the nature of the problems that they are trying to solve:
weapons system life-cycle management/ tactical planning and
doctrine/ force structuring/ education and training/ and
research and methodology. The distinction between models
and the modeling process is made and some of its
consequences explored. A survey of modeling methodologies
is presented: it includes high-resolution Monte Carlo
simulations/ Lanches ter-type models, analytical models,
manual war games/ firepower scores models, the hierarchy of
models concept/ and the Quantified Judgment Method of
Analysis. Finally/ a basic reading list on models is
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I . INTRODUCTION
This thesis was motivated by a desire to understand the
complete range of quantitative tools that the Army
operations research analyst may bring to the task of
understanding the land combat process. For each tool there
are assumptions upon wh i ch the use of the tool is
predicated. One method may be known to be superior in the
study of one class of problems but ineffective when applied
to other problems.
A particular type of model may require the collection of
enormous amounts of input data before it can be used,
forcing the analyst to decide whether the cost of collecting
and preparing the data is justified by the specific problem
to be analyzed. If not, he must select an alternative
methodol ogy
.
The analyst may be asked to participate in the
construction of a new model of land combat. He will be more
effective if he knows the various ways in which combat has
been modeled and has learned from others' mistakes.
Similarly, he needs knowledge of current methods and
state-of-the-art technologies. He should bring to the group
an understanding of the human enterprise of modeling in
general
.
The creation and use of models of land combat occur in
an environment populated by professional military and

civilian analysts/ tactical and strategic decisionmakers,
legislative and executive overseers, civilian contractors,
academicians and the press. In the solution of problems
involving weapons and tactics, the choices of the models to
use and the results they produce must be justified. The
analyst has the burden to use the most applicable model
avai 1 abl e.
This thesis was motivated by a perception that the wrong
model applied to a problem may result in conclusions and
decisions whose effect is worse than that of a decision made
without the use of any model. This research effort was
directed toward reducing that likelihood.

I I . THE USERS OF LAND COMBAT MODELS AND THEIR NEEDS
A. INTRODUCTION
Land combat models are important. The military defense
of the United States requires a military force strong enough
to deter aggression against its interests and, failing
deterrence, ready and capable enough to engage and defeat
the adversary in armed combat. The resources made available
to the Army, Navy and Air Force by the American people for
this purpose are limited both in times of peace and war.
The decisions to create new weapons systems, tailor the mix
of forces to perceived threats, train the serviceman to
optimally employ his tools, and create and test war plans
are difficult, complex decisions whose penalty for error can
be extremely costly to the country. The questions are very
important; the decisions are crucial. Intuition alone is
not sufficient. Models of land combat are a part of the
decisionmaking process.
Dr. F. B. Kapper [l~] , former advisor to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, argued that special studies and analysis are a
small key factor influencing the policy/decision maker.
Other factors he considered more important were national
strategy, objectives and priorities, politico-military
judgment, budgetary/
t
imi ng considerations and constraints,
past experience, a sense of history, our current value

system, and current intelligence and projected trends.
Models then are tools and not an end in themselves.
At the national level this may be true. However for a •
number of problems a land combat model may be the driving
element in the process of answering tough questions.
Decisionmakers want to make their decisions based on the
best information and judgment available at that time.
Decisionmakers in complex organizations are usually removed
from the people who are acquiring data, converting it into
information, distilling that information into conclusions
and recommendations/ and briefing their results to the
decisionmakers. He does not do the analysis; the analyst
does the analysis and presents recommendations.
The tools that the analyst uses depends on the given
problem, the resources available for analysis, and the
analyst's own knowledge and skills. The users of land
combat models may be divided in many ways. The author chose
to distinguish among users in the way discussed in Brewer
and Shubick [2] . They noted that the purpose for which a
model is built drives its use. Purposes are divided into
technical evaluations, force structure analysis, doctrinal
evaluation, teaching and training, and research. Each
purpose may require a different modeling approach and there




Technical evaluation means evaluation of weapons
systems. There is a life-cycle management process for each
weapon system which commences with an idea for a weapon
system to meet a perceived future military threat.
Competing concepts of weapons must be evaluated for
usefulness, planned cost/ manpower considerations and many
other factors long before even a prototype can be built.
Analysts working on these problems need models which can
accurately describe the physical weapon system: its
lethality, rate of fire, maneuverability, survivability, and
supply consumption.
C. FORCE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS
Force structure analysis means deciding how much of each
weapon system and how many people to put into each unit in
order to obtain the best expected effectiveness against the
enemy while remaining within budgetary constraints. Such
problems introduce the consideration of soldiers working as
coordinated teams. The "people factor" makes the question a
difficult one. For example, what is the marginal, or
additional, effectiveness of adding (or subtracting) another
weapon and operator to this unit? Can the unit become so
large that coordination problems begin to degrade unit
effectiveness? What should the assets of an Army division
11

be and how should they be divided among subordinate
commands? Such questions require their own set of models
and modeling approaches.
D. DOCTRINAL EVALUATION
Doctrinal evaluation seeks to find the best employment
of existing units composed of today's soldiers and weapons
against the current threat. Its focus is on optimizing what
is and what will be soon. The results of doctrinal
evaluations are doctrine which soldiers and units study,
practice and use. For the deployed small-unit, doctrinal
evaluation may be the testing of alternative tactics
tailored for the specific situation on the ground. A less
urgent use of doctrinal evaluation may be the creation of
doctrine to employ weapons systems in development but not
yet fielded, as in the case of the 1986 battlefield.
Practitioners in doctrinal areas have a different set of
questions to ask of their models.
E. TEACHING AMD TRAINING
Teaching and training models focus more on the human
experiencing the model and less on the process being
modeled. The goal may be to confront the subject or subject
group with a new situation requiring decisions and actions
which can later be critiqued. The goal may be to reinforce
doctrine or previously learned lessons, as in practice to
12

improve skills. The human factor of such models makes the
principle of independent replication / so important to the
scientific method in the physical sciences, very difficult.
Indeed, the purpose of such models is to train.
F. RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY
The research and methodology purpose is directed toward
inventing better models, improving existing models and
synthesizing results from diverse intellectual activities
into new products and procedures to improve the state of
modeling. Efforts in this direction may include advanced
mathematical probability models or new ways to analyze the
results of experiments with human subjects. The focus is on
attempting something new or on refining current modeling
technology without the guarantee of success. New results
are published in academic and professional journals and
should stand the test of the scientific method. The
research and methodology purpose seeks to expand knowledge
and develop better tools.
G. CONCLUSION
The variety of models is a natural consequence of the
variety of questions which may be asked about land combat.
According to Dr. W. B. Payne [3], former Deputy
Undersecretary of the Army, the pursuit of a single,
all-purpose, preferred model of any aspect of land combat is
13

to be avoided. However, the resulting proliferation of
models can give the analyst a difficult choice of which
model to use and why. When approaching a model, the analyst
should determine the purpose for which the model was
created. Different purposes result in different types of
models. The model's purpose (or purposes) help to reveal
the potential usefulness of the model in solving the
question in hand.
More information on the purposes, uses, costs and
problems of models, simulations and games was found in




III. A SURVEY OF APPROACHES TO THE MODELING
OF LAND COMBAT
A. MODELS AND THE MODELING PROCESS
According to Morris [k] , modeling is an intuitive and
artful process v;hich results in objects called models. A
model is an abstract representation of reality which is used
for the purpose of prediction and to develop understanding
about the real -world process [5] . Modeling attempts to draw
out some sort of conceptual structure and order from
perceptual confusion. The development of skill in modeling
involves three basic hypotheses. First / one begins with
very simple models and attempts to evolve toward more
complex and / hopefully / more realistic models. This is the
process of enrichment. Second / previously developed models
with their finalized logical structures furnish reasonable
starting points for the modeling process. This is the use
of analogy. Third / the model must confront the data and be
modified, and the assumptions of the model must be refined
until a solution is possible. These two looping processes
are called alternation.
The modeler proceeds from his starting points to
elaborate, refine and redo his model by tr i al -and-error . He
attempts to validate it and, if necessary, starts all over
again. The modeling process is necessarily subjective f6j .
15

When finished, he presents a completed model and a narrative
containing the justification of the model. What is usually
not revealed is the process of discovery which leads from
start to finish, but rarely by a direct path. An excellent
description of this process of discovery covering a number
of years' work in creating a model is contained in Dupuy £7/.
The modeling of land combat begins with one fundamental
assumption: the combat processes being modeled are "regular
enough" so that the model v/ith its variables will capture
the essential elements of the processes. If the combat
processes are believed to be too unpredictable to model/
then one has no basis upon which to construct a model.
During Morris' alternation phase as the model confronts real
data/ the model proves to be predictable or it does not.
When the model proves to be inadequate/ one refines and
revises. The very act of beginning to model must/ however/
be based on the belief that the combat processes being
modeled are essentially predictable.
The analyst prefers to create and exercise a model
rather than to work only with empirical data. The human
mind is analog/ not digital. It prefers pictures and graphs
to tables of numbers. Empirical data cannot be thorough
enough to answer every "what if" question which may need to
be explored. The model represents a convenience to the
analyst from which he hopes to extract the essence of what
is being modeled. Furthermore/ it is difficult if not
impossible to discern from tables of numbers those factors
which strongly influence the process and those which do not.
16

A model attempts to summarize all the data without the loss
of important information. Analyzing the model rather than
analyzing the empirical data provides the best path toward
understanding the process being modeled.
The second part of Morris 1 alternation phase is
profoundly important. It does the analyst little good to
postulate a set of assumptions which lead to a model which
cannot be solved. The model builder adds to his assumptions
until he has a model which can be solved. Then he may relax
an assumption and attempt to solve the resulting new model.
As an example, in probability models a frequent assumption
is that the occurrence of a phenomenon just observed is
independent of the previous occurrences of the phenomenon.
In real life that assumption is orobably unrealistic, but,
if one assumes dependence, the resulting model may be
impossible to solve. The modeler assumes independence to
make the mathematics simpler and solves his model. He still
has the responsibility to explain the assumptions, caveat
all results produced, and explore further methods of solving
the "impossible" model. He also has the responsibility to
discard the model if the independence assumption produces
nonsense results.
Prior to the widespread availability of computers,
models had to be solved by hand. This restricted modelers
to assumptions which resulted in models which could be
solved that way. The origins of western operations research
lay in attempting to solve some complex military problems
during the conduct of World War II. The solution techniques
17

relied on "back of the envelope" hand calculations to solve
grossly simple models. The advent of the computer and the
programmable hand-held calculator permit the modeler to
formulate models which cannot be solved by hand but can be
solved numerically. An example of such a model is presented
in Appendix B. Computer technology has expanded the freedom
to relax assumptions and still solve the model.
B. A PARTITION OF LAND COMBAT MODELS
There are many models of land combat and determining a
classification system was difficult. However, the author
partitioned the set of combat models into two subsets: micro
and macro.
A micro-model results from an attempt to model various
subprocesses of the major process and then tie together, or
"lash up" all the subprocesses into a model which faithfully
represents the major process. Categories of models which
may be considered to be micro-models are high-resolution
Monte Carlo simulations, free-standing analytical models,
f i tted-parameter analytical models and the hierarchy of
models concept. The modeler goes as deeply as he thinks is
necessary into subprocesses, models them as accurately as
possible, and then assembles the parts into a whole. He
believes that this approach is better than others in
producing models able to answer his users' questions and




A macro-model results from an attempt to model the
results of the major process with aggregated variables and
not at the component level. Categories of models which may
be considered as macro-models are manual and
computer-assisted war games, Lanches ter-type model s,
firepower scores models, and the Quantified Judgment Model.
The macro-modeler is concerned with describing large systems
by means of aggregated variables. For example, the "combat
power" of a Russian infantry corps in World War II was
described in the commercial war game "Stalingrad" as two
numbers: seven when on the attack and ten when on the
defense. Comparisons with the combat power number of
opposing and friendly units then formed the basis for
modeling attrition at the corps level. These numbers
attempt to capture the relationship between large forces in
a way which opposing war game players can quickly understand
and manipulate.
An analogy may be drawn between this partition of land
combat models and the distinction in economics between micro
and macroeconomics. Mi croeconomi sts model the economic
behavior of the individual and the firm. These are the
building blocks or components of their process which are
lashed together up to the level of the industry.
Macroeconomi sts model the national and international process
by specifying aggregate variables such as money supply,
capital outlays, and the balance of payments. 3ased on
observations and collected data, both sets of economists




In the discussion wh i ch follows, the author presents a
survey of the categories of land combat models which focuses
on the major modeling assumptions in evidence. Each model is
different and unique, but within categories there are common
themes which characterize the modeling approach.
C. HIGH-RESOLUTION MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
A simulation is a model v/hich runs completely without
human intervention [8J . The simulation is called .Monte
Carlo if a random sampling procedure is used for determining
values of variables which may take on many possible values.
Such models are stochastic: they permit the modeling of
chance. The solution of a deterministic model results in
the same answer every time, whereas stochastic models can,
and typically do, produce different results each time they
are solved.
The two high-resolution Monte Carlo simulations examined
were CARMONETTE [9] and STAR, the Simulation of Tactical
Alternative Responses p.0, 11, 12, 13j . They are
implemented on high-speed digital computers: human solution
of such models is impossible. Both models reflect the
micro-modeling approach to the brief intense engagement
phase of land combat at the individual weapon system/vehicle
level of detail. The subprocesses which are modeled may be
classified as physical or behavioral.
Some examples of physical processes are weapon system
20

effects (direct fire, indirect fire, air and air defense),
terrain and 1 i ne-of-s i ght, casualty assessment, time and
movement. Some examples of behavioral processes are target
selection and firing, fire control and communications,
movement decision (ground and air), command and control,
detection and supression.
As may be expected in the modeling of so many processes,
there were a multitude of explicit and implicit rules,
simplifications and assumptions. The modelers created a
structure which, within explicit constraints, permitted the
user to create the battle to suit his needs. The modeling of
the physical processes has been extensively studied and
documented \lkj . The modeling of the behavioral processes
has less empirical basis. The modelers required that most
behavioral decisions be inputs into the model by the user.
These consisted of orders and many other "if the situation
is this, do that" decision rules.
Two examples of simplifying behavioral assumptions were
enlightening. Both models play detection equals
identification. A defender who detects a moving target at
3000 meters (1.87 miles) immediately knows the type of
vehicle and whether it is friendly or hostile. One could
object that this is unrealistic, to which the modeler
responds, "Then tell me by how much to degrade this
phenomenon, and why." Both models play target selection
equals the decision to fire. World War II data compiled by
General S. L. A. Marshall [l5j indicated that only 25
percent of U. S. soldiers in an engagement actually fired
21

their weapons. To the extent that such assumptions are
unjustified and important, the results of such models may be
biased.
Both models used the event scheduling approach to
simulation modeling which permits the modeler to prepare a
system description by concentrating on the moments in time
when the state of the system changes pL6j . Events which
should occur at some time in the future, say a detection or
a round's impact, are placed onto a list of pending events,
and are acted upon when the simulation clock advances to
coincide with the event's time. This assumes that the
modelers were skillful and accurate i n .orchestrat i ng this
complex collection of processes. This "lash up"' assumption
exists in all micro-modeling efforts. The process of model
verification, or proving that the mathematics in the model
is behaving properly, minimizes the likelihood of "lash up"
errors.
Modelers point to several advantages that simulations
possess [is] . They can compress or expand time, identify
and control sources of variation, eliminate real-world
errors of measurement, stop, analyze and restore the state
of the simulation, and replicate an experiment under tight
control. They are useful research tools when systems get
too large for analytical solution. They can, however,
become mired in detail, thwarting clear analysis of the
resul ts .
For the analyst, the greatest advantage of a simulation
may lie in the ability to "empirically" observe the
22

Interaction of several factors producing a result much
greater than (or much less than) the factors acting alone
could be expected to produce. This phenomenon is called
synergy. For example, smoke on the battlefield does not
kill, but, in conjunction with a minefield, it may result in
much more effectiveness for the minefield than if the smoke
were not there. Simulations may permit the quantification
of such effects.
High-resolution simulations are complex. The analyst
who uses one must consult available documentation and the
modelers, if possible, to determine the assumptions of the
model and whether he can justify to himself and his
superiors its use. The modeler must document thoroughly his
assumptions and techniques.
Modeling via simulation assumes that a good analytical
solution is not possible or desirable. It assumes the
modeler's ability to describe "well enough" the processes
involved and to bring them together into a unified whole
which faithfully simulates land combat.
D. LANCHESTER-TYPE MODELS OF COMBAT
In 1914 Frederick W. Lanchester postulated two sets of
simple differential equations to model combat between two
homogeneous forces. His purpose was to justify
quantitatively the principle of concentration under "modern
conditions" of warfare JJL7J • From then to the present, no
other mathematical model of combat has been so widely
23

studied or used. His models / as modified and extended by H.
K. Weiss, R. Helmbold, H. Brackney, S. J. Deitchman and
others, so dominate the field of quantified analytical
modeling of land combat that the professional analyst must
understand the operation of and assumptions underlying these
models. Force-on-Force Attrition Modeling by James G. Taylor
provides, for the first time, one book in which the basic
models and extensions of Lanchester's theory are presented
in a manner permitting the analyst to grasp the key ideas.
Lanchester-type models seek to describe the process of
two forces attritting one another in terms of the rate at
which each force is receiving casualties. Casualties are
seen as a function of time (how long the battle lasts) and
the casual ty rate.
It was helpful to the author to consider this analogy.
Suppose one were in an automobile driving at a constant
rate, or velocity. The distance covered would be a function
of time and the constant velocity, as in
distance = rate x time .
Suppose now that instead there were other influences acting
on the driver so that sometimes he had to accelerate or
decelerate, but he did not stop or drive in reverse. Then
the calculation of how far he had driven in a period of time
would be more complicated but the underlying structure of
distance as a function of the rate and time period would
still hold.
Analytical modelers using Lanchester-type equations seek
to find the best expression for the casualty rate for the
21+

scenario being modeled. In the case of the driver, it makes
a difference in the rate whether he is travelling over a
flat highway or through winding mountains. Similarly,
direct fire "aimed" weapons have one set of casualty rates
but "area" fire weapons have a different set of rate
expressions. The modeler chooses that set of rate
expressions which are appropriate.
These are examples of scenarios for which the "best" set
of casualty rate expressions have been determined:
(1) Both sides use "aimed" fire and target-acquisition
times are constant and independent of the number of enemy
targets
.
(2) Both sides use "area" fire against constant-density
defenses
.
(3) Both sides use "area" fire against constant-area
defenses
(k) Both sides use "aimed" fire with the time to detect an
enemy target inversely proportional to the number of enemy
targets and also much greater than the time required to
kill an acquired target.
(5) Both the assaulting force and defending force use
"aimed" fire but the time to acquire targets is much less
for the defending force.
(6) The ambushing force uses "aimed" fire but the ambushed
force, not knowing where the ambushers are, return "area"
f i re.
(7) Both forces use "aimed" fire but also suffer
operational losses not caused by enemy action (sickness,
accidents, desertions, etc.)
(8) Both forces use "aimed" fire and are supported by
"area" fire support weapons not subject to attrition.
The specific casualty rate expressions for each scenario are
given in Taylor fl8] . Knowing the proper set of casualty
rate expressions and the starting force levels of each side,
the analyst can solve the resulting deterministic battle.
25

The equations for modeling these scenarios assume that
the forces being modeled are homogeneous. This means that
every unit on each side has exactly the same capability for
killing enemy forces and exactly the same vulnerability to
enemy action, but each unit kills opposing enemy units at
different rates. This is clearly a strong simplifying
assumption which for many scenarios is not reasonable.
Therefore, the concept of homogeneous combat was extended to
heterogeneous combat, or combat between combined-arms teams.
The modeler of heterogeneous combat must specify the
fraction of each weapon type which engages each opposing
weapon type, or the allocation factor. To use the resulting
sets of equations he assumes that the attrition effects of
various different enemy weapon types against a particular
friendly target type are additive (no synergistic, mutual
support effects) and that the casualty rate of each weapon
type is proportional to the number of enemy firers of that
type [19] .
These sets of equations, when given with the initial
force levels, cannot be solved by hand. The analyst must
resort to a computer to obtain a numerical solution. The
author was concerned that perhaps heterogeneous combat
models were beyond the capability of the typical military
analyst and solvable only by contractors or dedicated
analysis agencies using large, powerful and costly
high-speed digital computers. However, the implementation
of a numerical solution by discrete approximation appeared
feasible. An attempt to convert this idea into a program
26

for a Texas Instruments Programmable 59 hand-held calculator
was made and the program is given in Appendix B. This means
that an analyst who has values for the starting force
levels / attrition rate coefficients and allocation factors
can solve the resulting battle at his desk. He can
postulate different values in a "what if" exploratory mode
and obtain quick answers for comparison.
For example / suppose that in weapon design analysis one
wanted to analyze the alternatives of increasing the
probability of a round's hit by ten percent or increasing
the rate of fire by ten percent. Assuming access to a
supportive data base, an analyst using the methods of
Appendix B could begin to explore the problem without an
initial expensive outlay of computer and analysis resources.
More in-depth analysis may follow / directed down paths which
appear most promising based on an essentially "quick and
dirty" macro-level analysis of the problem.
Trie two analytical modeling approaches discussed below
depend upon the assumption that combat attrition, on
average, follows Lanchester-type models "well enough." To
use such models the analyst assumes that the discrete
attrition process can be accurately approximated by a
continuous Lanchester process over time. As a result the
analyst is involved in real-valued and not integer-valued
casualties. For larger force sizes, this approximation
seems reasonable. He also assumes that attrition, like
distance in the case of the automobile example, can truly be
described as a function (probably complicated) of rates over
27

time. To arrive at such a description the analyst nay need
to decompose the battlefield spatially or temporally.
Fundamentally"/ he assumes that a model based on weapons and
their rates captures the essential nature of the combat
process being modeled.
E. FREE-STANDING ANALYTICAL MODELS
An analytical model is a set of mathematical equations
which relates independent variables (inputs) to dependent
.
variables (outputs). The equation of a straight line,
y = mx + b
describes precisely the relationship between any number x
and the resulting output y. This equation is a
deterministic analytical model.
An analytical model of land combat seeks to describe the
process mathematically. Free-standing analytical models use
the same types of inputs (i.e., weapon system
characteristics, starting levels of forces, decision rules)
as do a high-resolution simulations j~20j . This is in
contrast to f i tted-parameter analytical models which take
data from high-resolution simulations.
Free-standing analytical models of combat are a subset
of models using Lanchester-type equations. The primary
contributor to the creation and use of free-standing
analytical models is Dr. Seth Bonder of Vector Research,
Inc. His modeling approach was to describe mathematically
the expected time for one fi rer to kill one passive target
28

for each possible pair of weapon types on the battlefield
under study. By making the kill rate equal to the
reciprocal of the expected time to kill, one can use
Lanches ter-type equations of heterogeneous combat to solve
the firefight being modeled [21, 22, 23].
This modeling approach led to models (BONDER-IUA, Vector
family) which require large amounts of performance input
data, are fast-running but which are distant from the
analyst and decisionmaker because of the advanced
mathematics and probability theory underlying the models.
The models are deterministic.
There are several major assumptions inherent in the
structure of a free-standing analytical model. The most
important variable in the combat process is weapon system
effectiveness. This is reasonable since "a careful study of
past military history and particularly of the 'little
picture 1 of our own infantry operations in the past war
(World War II) leads to the conclusion that weapons when
correctly handled in battle seldom fail to gain victory."
(2^J It is assumed that the parameters of the probability
distribution for attrition rates are measurable capabilities
of v/eapon systems and that the attrition-rate coefficients
for Lanchester-type equations can be predicted prior to the
inception of an engagement [23j . Hence there is a
requirement for a large amount of performance input data.
Another assumption implied in these modeling efforts is that
quantifying weapon system effectiveness by examining an
active firer against a passive target (a one-sided duel) is
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a sufficiently accurate representation. To extend the
passive model to a mobile firefight requires additional
assumptions about the variation of kill rates over range [22]
It is assumed that the "lash up" of individual one-on-one
duels into a heterogeneous firefight is properly
accomplished. Human behavior, such as detection and firing,
is modeled mathematically. The empirical basis for these
assumptions is not known to the author. Finally, it is
assumed that Lanchester's theory of combat is essentially
correct but incomplete and accounts for any synergistic
effects on the battlefield.
It was evident to the author that thi s model i ng approach
depends considerably upon the second part of Morris 1
alternation phase: add assumptions until the mathematics is
solvable. The mathematical models derived and solved
represent a formidable intellectual accomplishment.
These analytical models provide the analyst v/ith a tool
in which variables may be adjusted to see the results. This
facility, known as sensitivity analysis, is an important
feature for the analyst. If the model can quickly answer
questions such as, "If we had 3 more XM1 tanks in the blue
force, how different is the battle outcome?" then the
analyst has a powerful tool for exploring his problem
thoroughl y
.
The extension of the firefight (BONDER-IUA) model to a
theater-level (i.e., European) model v/as made in an attempt
to overcome perceived difficulties with firepower scores
models of large-scale war (such as ATLAS). Some
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documentation for VECTOR-0, a prototype of the VECTOR family
of models, was examined to determine the types of
assumptions made J25J . The modeling of terrain as sectors
and time as discrete units, normally one day, resembled the
manual war gaming approach. Forces were quantified into
categories: battalion task forces, maneuver forces in
reserve, artillery, attack helicopters, air defense and
tactical aircraft. The assumptions underlying especially
the last three categories were extensive. Also modeled were
supplies, user-input tactical decision rules and seven
tactical activities. The processes modeled were attrition,
reorganization of forces, supply, movement, tactical
decision and activity assignment. The attr i t ion- process
used the same approach as the BONDER-IUA model: one-on-one
duels furnish the attrition rate coefficients for a
Lanchester-type heterogeneous model of combat.
The authors of VECTOR-0 acknowledged a number of
important limitations on their modeling effort. Many
simplifying assumptions were made in order to demonstrate
the feasibility of the prototype. Only a linear or integral
FEBA was modeled. None of the functions of intelligence,
command, control and communications was played. Terrain
classes were not modeled and only a limited number of ground
combat scenarios were included. The author did not examine
documentation of VECTOR-1 or VECTOR-2 to determine the
extent to which these assumptions and simplifications were
replaced in these production models.
The modeling of free-standing analytical models involves
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assumptions on the ability of the modeler to mathematically
describe firefights as a complex set of one-on-one duels
linked together by a heterogeneous model of combat. The
analyst who uses free-standing analytical models accepts and
lives with its assumptions.
F. FITTED -PARAMETER ANALYTICAL MODELS
Modelers and users of high-resolution simulations must
carefully choose the scenarios they wish to explore because
data collection and formatting data for input can be an
expensive / time-consuming process. To achieve a degree of
statistical stability the simulation must be replicated,
meaning that the exact same scenario is played many times
but with different random numbers [26J . The results of many
replications of several scenarios are several discrete sets
of outputs each representing a single scenario. However the
analyst may need to know what would happen in a scenario
which lay between the scenarios already simulated.
One answer to his need is to set up and simulate that
new scenario, but that is expensive and incomplete. Another
approach is to use a f i tted-parameter analytical model.
Such a model takes the observations of casualties in a
simulation replication as if they were actual combat data,
estimates statistically the expected time for one weapon
system type to kill another weapon system type, and then
uses the reciprocal of expected time as the kill -rate for a
Lanchester-type heterogeneous combat model. Such models
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became possible in 1969 when Dr. Gordon Clark postulated and
solved the COMAN model [2 7"]. These models are also a subset
of Lanches ter-type models of combat.
The modeling assumptions of the f i tted-parameter
analytical approach are essentially two: the results of a
high-resolution Monte Carlo simulation are "close" to actual
combat data, and the battle data represent a sample from the
Markov-chain analog to the deterministic Lanchester-type
homogeneous equations of combat J28l . This effectively
means that the distribution of times between casualties is
modeled as being exponential and independent. Thus to all
the assumptions of the simulations are added the assumption
that combat attrition observed in the simulation is, in the
mean or average sense, Lanchestr i an.
The analytical model uses the statistical principle of
maximum likelihood estimation to convert the observed times
between casualties to parameters used in heterogeneous
models of combat, hence the name "fi tted-parameter . " These
estimates are characterized by their simplicity and ease of
manipulation in a simple heterogeneous model.
Clark's idea of the COMAN model was adopted by Research
Analysis Corporation (later part of General Research
Corporation) and evolved into COMANEX (COMAN Extended). U.
S. Army TRADOC Systems Analysis Agency has used Clark's
ideas to create COMANEW (COMAN nEW) to estimate
attrition-rate coefficients from replications of the
high-resolution simulation CARMONETTE.
The fi tted-parameter analytical model provides the
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analog representations of reality in a size which permits
manipulation and communication between players.
A war game consists of several basic components: a
terrain board, playing pieces, a terrain-effects chart, an
attrition-effects chart, the sequence of play, victory
conditions and, if desired, a randomized decisionmaking
instrument, usually a die. A computer may be used to
organize the data and ease the burden of calculations, but
all decisions are made by human players or by chance.
Although there are a few games which play individual weapons
systems and soldiers, most war games involve some amount of
aggregation of weapons and organizational (logistics,
command, control, communication, morale, leadership, etc.)
effects into more abstract playing pieces. This level of
aggregation and abstraction is fixed for the game and
players do not decompose and recompose their pieces. If the
game is historical, it is essentially benchmarked against
real historical combat data. This benchmarking process does
not ask how or why all the subprocesses converged into the
historical result, but rather concentrates on the results
and key elements.
An aggregated war game is a macro-model of combat in
which the number of elements is intentionally kept small.
The basic assumption involved in the use of a war game is
that the modeler has correctly captured the key elements of
the combat scenario being simulated. As with all modeling,
this is a difficult task to accomplish. The dimensions
which such an assumption can assume were made clear to the
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analyst with a quick-running heterogeneous model for which
the attrition-rate coefficients are "benchmarked" by a
complex simulation. As Clark concluded,
Given a set of replications from the combat simulation,
the COMAN model could be used in optimization or trade-off
studies to evaluate a large number of alternative force
structures which would be a laborious process with the
combat simulation. Also, the COMAN model could be used to
evaluate the outcome of small -unit engagements in a
large-unit model [29] .
Use of such a model implies acceptance of the assumptions
underlying both simulations and Lanchester-type models of
combat
.
G. MANUAL WAR GAMES
Manual war games are the oldest models of land combat.
The game of chess represents pre-gunpowder combat quite
well, according to Mr. James Dunnigan, owner of Simulations
Publications, inc. (SPI), in guest lecture remarks at the
Naval Postgraduate School. The ancient oriental game of Go,
whose strategies are many times more complex than chess,
models siege combat. Such games, together with the
commercial historical war games, form a surprisingly large
segment of recreational activity in this country. There are
some 30,000 subscribers to SPI's "Strategy and Tactics"
magazine and Brewer and Shubick estimated that "the number
of serious amateur war gamers in the United States in 1976
was about 40,000. This population is considerably larger
than that of professional war gamers." fjq] Manual war
games appeal to human senses of sight and touch; they are
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author by Dunnigan [3lJ in his discussion of how to design a
war game. Design is guided by two cardinal principles: keep
it simple and plagiarize ("use available techniques"). He
identifies ten steps which are generally followed:
The first step, and the most important one, is concept
development. You must determine at the very beginning
what it is that you want to do. The second step is
research ... The third step is what I have dubbed
integration. This is where you take all of the research
material and your knowledge of game mechanics and
integrate it into a prototype game. The fourth step is
fleshing out this prototype, coming up, in effect, with
something that looks remarkably close to the finished
game. ..The fifth step is to prepare a first draft of your
rules. ..The sixth step is one of the more difficult ones.
It is game development. This means playtesting and
changing the game and rewriting the rules and taking a lot
of abuse from people who would rather play than
design. ..The seventh step is what I call blind testing.
This is where you take your physical prototype and your
written rules and send them out to somebody who can play
the game without your presence. .. The eighth step occurs
when all of your blind testing results have come back and
have been integrated into the manuscript... The ninth step
is product ion. . .There is much potential danger in this
phase of game design. The tenth step is also extremely
critical if you are going to design any more games. This
is the feedback step. You must systematically collect
feedback from those who play your game to see where you
went right and where you went wrong. .. There is a lot more
to the 10 game-designing steps than I have briefly
explained. The tricks of the trade are what make these
steps functional. The tricks that have been uncovered in
the last 10 years could fill a few books pi].
Both Dunnigan and Morris [k] express the belief that
modeling is an art acquired by active participation and
tr i al -and-error . The modeler, since he deals with an
abstraction, is always making judgments and assumptions.
With an historical game, the emphasis is less on
quantitative, mathematical skills and more on the ability to
convert research into key elements modeled in a humanly
understandable way. "Generally, the more accurate your
36

perception regarding the critical elements in the battle/
the better the game will be." (31J An example of what can
go wrong in designing a war game is given in Appendix A. It
also serves as an example of Dunnigan's seventh step, blind
test i ng.
E. S. Quade, in discussing the value of games, noted
that
games fail to achieve realism in a great many
respects ... unl ess the game designer specifically guards
against it, the usual assumptions are likely to lead to
plans or postures that are far more efficient in their use
of resources than are found in real life. However the
technique of manual gaming... can do much to facilitate a
policy study. Admittedly, the predictive quality of such
an exercise is very clearly a function of the quality of
intuitive insight provided by the experts involved. In
contrast, by allowing for the introduction of judgment at
every step, the game provides an opportunity to take into
account intangible factors often considered completely
outside the scope of anal ys i s. .. Games can uncover errors
or omissions in concept; it can explore assumptions and
uncover the implicit ones; it can check coordination
measures; it can develop the contingencies on which a plan
depends; it can draw out divided opinions; it can examine
the feasibility of an operational concept ... But, of
course, it can give very limited indication of failure or
success of particular strategies [32] .
The author feels that the primary advantage of gaming lies
in the active participation of human decisionmaking. The
mind, in its mysterious way, integrates pictures, symbols,
concepts, stresses and goals into a plan and behavior
pattern which may not be mathematically optimal but is human
and real. To the criticism that games are too variable to
quantify for analysis, the author suggests research into the
concept of an "expected value" game between pairs of
opponents as explained in Appendix A as a possible
methodology. This concept is also similar to the solution
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of iiames by fictitious play J33*]
.
H. FIREPOWER SCORES MODELS
Firepower scores models seek to represent the combat
potential of heterogeneous forces by an index-number. This
approach is similar to attrition modeling in war games in
wh i ch all the attack factors of one side are summed into one
attack number and the defense factors of the other side are
summed into one defense number for each battle. Combat is
resolved and casualties assessed based on the ratio of these
two numbers. The scores and indices may be known as
firepower score/ index of combat effectiveness (FS/ICE),
firepower potent i al /uni t firepower potential (FP/UFP),
firepower potential score/index of firepower potential
(FPS/IFP), weapon effectiveness index/weighted unit value
(WEI/WUV), weapon effectiveness value (WEV) and other names
The modeler determines the relative combat power of each
weapon in a unit / assigns a value of one to the least
effective weapon (usually a rifle) and assigns higher scores
to more potent weapon systems. The unit index is the sum
over all weapon systems of the number of weapons present
times its score, and it represents the aggregation of
heterogeneous forces into a single homogeneous force. The
reader should note that this is in contrast to the design of
a war game since blind testing feedback allows the war game
designer to tinker with the indices empirically and not have
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to make an explicit computation.
This system of indices has been used by force planners
since World War II. It reflects an attempt to find a
general theory of aggregating and disaggregating forces
apart from a specific historical scenario which a war gamer
may model. A widely-used firepower scores model/ A
Tactical/ Logistical and Air Simulation (ATLAS)/ began its
life as QUICK GAME/ a "two-sided/ open, semirigidly
assessed, grossly aggregated/ manually operated war game for
feasibility testing of plans and exercises/ and for gross
evaluation of force capabilities." [35J The success of QUICK
GAME led to computerized QUICK GAME, in which the rules
became more rigid and replication became less costly. After
revisions and expansions it became ATLAS. A fine history of
the evolution of operational gaming as practiced at Research
Analysis Corporation is given by Hausrath [35j .
Firepower scores models represent a macro-model of
combat grossly based on the count of weapons systems/ tons
of supplies and air resources. An attempt is made to
calibrate casualties, movement of the front and supply
consumption to historical data, usually from World War II.
There can be data problems, as discussed in a recent General
Accounting Office report [36]* A more serious assumption is
the modeler's ability to correctly aggregate and
d isaggregate. Bode C3 7J emphas i zed the information reducing
nature of aggregation and the difficulty, if not
impossibility, of recreating the details later. If the
essence of the scenario being modeled depended on details
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that were aggregated, then the analyst could reach incorrect
conclusions. For example, did ten percent attrition at the
corps level mean complete destruction of one battalion, or
partial destruction of three battalions, or minor casualties
to all battalions? If the analyst needs these answers, then
he should probably ask his questions of a different type of
model
.
I. HIERARCHY OF MODELS CONCEPT
The Army Models Review Committee of 1971 defined the
hierarchy of models as "a set of models in which the outputs
of one element in the set become inputs to another element
in the set." j.33"] For example, the division or brigade may
be the basic elements in a theater-level model, the
battalion the basic component of a division-level model and
the individual weapon system or soldier the basic component
of the high-resolution model.
The hierarchy of models concept seeks to link models
designed for these various levels together in a two-way
linkage. The first is from high-resolution to highly
aggregated models in order to feed information about combat
up. The second is from top to bottom for the purpose of
defining the scenarios for investigation by the
high-resolution models. In theory, any set of micro-models
of combat could be "lashed together" into any aggregated
model
.
One operational model based on this concept is a

theater-level model developed by the British Defence
Operational Analysis Establishment (DOAE). As described by
Dare [39], it consists of a high-resolution Battle Group
Model using Army officers to ^ame the scenarios and
Lanchester-type equations for attrition modeling. This
model feeds the Corps Model whose piston-like sectors
resemble those in ATLAS. It uses an extended form of
Lanchester-type equations. The output of the Corps Model
becomes input to the Central Front Game, a computer-assisted
war game of sectors. Also deriving input from the Corps
Model is the NATO Deployment Model, a linear programming
model wh i ch provides "an optimum allocation of the
defenders' forces to the deployment zones to meet the set of
threats as well as an estimate of the length of time for
which the final phase line can be held against the most
difficult threats." [39]
Section F discusses another family of models wh i ch fits
the hierarchy of models concept: the COMAN, COMANEX, COMANEW
f i tted-parameter analytical models. They use outputs of
high-resolution Monte Carlo simulations to calculate the
attrition coefficients for Lanchester-type models.
This modeling approach attempts to substitute model
outputs for actual combat data from wars of the future,
perhaps using weapons not yet produced or deployed. The
analyst using such a model accepts the set of assumptions
underlying each component model. He also accepts that the
information passed between models was the important
information and that the transmission of information was

undistorted. He assumes that the "lash up" of component
models was done well.
J. QUANTIFIED JUDGMENT METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The last model of land combat considered was the
Quantified Judgment Method of Analysis (QJMA) as developed
by Colonel T. N. Dupuy [7J and his associates at the
Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO). The
model began in 1964 with the study of weapons effectiveness
and evolved over a decade of historical research and
empirical model bui 1 di ng.
The model is essentially a firepower scores model
elaborately modified by the variables of combat and a battle
outcome model. To compute the Theoretical Lethality Index
(TLI), the modeler examines twelve factors ranging from rate
of fire to fire control and ammunition supply effects. The
TLI is then converted into the Operational Lethality Index
(OLI) which is the firepov/er scores building block.
The basic OLI's are then adjusted by 73 variables of
combat which are divided into the eleven categories of
weapon, mobility and tactical air effects, terrain, weather,
season, air superiority, posture and vulnerability factors,
other combat processes and intangible factors. Dupuy
maintains that
No two battles are alike. No matter how similar two
combat situations may appear to be, there are inevitably
many differences, no matter how slight, in circumstances,
and in the composition of the opposing forces. Anything
that may change between battles, or during battle, may be
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termed a variable of combat / no natter what the reason for
change or difference may be. HERO has identified 73
separate Combat Var i ab les . . . Th i s list is almost certainly
i ncompl ete--but it is close to including all currently
identifiable variables that affect combat outcomes jj*0"j.
Of these variables, most are always calculable, two
(logistics and combat effectiveness) are sometimes
calculable, eight are probably calculable but not yet
calculated, and eight are intangible and probably
individually incalculable.
QJMA is best described in its author's own words.
The QJMA is a method of comparing the relative combat
effectiveness of two opposing forces in historical combat,
by determining the influence of environmental and
operational variables upon the force strengths of the two
opponents. The heart of the QJMA is a model of historical
combat called the Quantified Judgment Model (QJM). The
model is applied to statistics of selected historical
engagements and produces values for the Combat Power
Potentials of the two opposing forces under the
circumstances of the engagement, and a Combat Power Ratio
to ascertain which of the opposing sides--on the basis of
data available in the records--shoul d theoretically have
been successful in the engagement, and by what margin.
This Combat Power Ratio is next compared to a
quantification of the actual outcome of the battle. This
outcome value, derived from consulting the records,
represents ... the comparative performance of the opposing
forces in terms of (1) their accomplishment of their
respective missions, (2) their ability to gain or hold
ground, and (3) their efficiency in terms of casualties
incurred. If the Combat Power Ratio of Force A with
respect to Force B is greater than 1, then the Result
Value for Force A should be greater than that for Force B.
In the event of a different relationship between Combat
Power Ratio and Result Values, or if the Result Value
differential is not consistent with "normal" relationships
of Combat Power Ratios and Result Values, further
exploration is necessary to explain the discrepancy, wh i ch
is usually due to behavioral considerations...
When they are not consistent we can be certain that the
inconsistency is due to some exceptional combat
phenomenon, which is usually explicable after further
study and analysis. In fact, it has been through the
exploration of the causes of such inconsistencies that the
value of the QJMA as an analytical tool has been greatest [>fj
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Two of the results from analyzing inconsistencies were the
quantification of surprise and a national overall combat
effectiveness value for one soldier \j+ 2 J • The results on
the factor of surprise were published in "Army" magazine [h3l
and a discussion of German versus Russian combat
effectiveness is contained in Appendix A.
Having developed the historical QJMA by 1973, Dupuy
sought to test it against modern combat. He obtained
information from both sides of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli
War and successfully analyzed the war. He found that "there
was a major methodological conclusion. The value of the QJM
was reaffirmed as a unique tool for combat experience
analysis, as a coherent, comprehensive theory of combat, and
as a valid simulation of modern combat with modern weapons."
HERO also analyzed the relationship between its
firepower scores as modified and Lanchester's theory of
combat. Dr. Janice Fain's analysis led to the conclusion
that
the Lanchester Equations provide reliable casualty rates
only when combat power values for opposing forces reflect
the variables of combat, as formulated by HERO's QJM...It
shows an interesting convergence between these two very
different approaches to a representation of combat, one
theoretical and one empirical. Above all, it demonstrates
the significance of considering the variables of combat
when attempting to analyze anything like a force ratio
The author noted with interest that the apparent inadequacy
of Lanchester's theory led both Bonder and Dupuy to
elaborate the theory in quite different ways. Neither

concluded that combat was too variable to be analyzed or
pred icted.
In summation, Dupuy offered a clear contrast between his
QJI1A and other methods presented earlier.
It is in its concept of variables, and their application,
that the methodology described in this book differs most
radically from other modern models, or simulations of
combat. We believe that the concept of variable factors,
representing environmental and operational effects upon
the readily calculable firepower effects of weapons, is a
reasonable, logical approach to representing the actual
battlefield influence and effects of such weapons. It is
not necessarily the only approach which can be reasonable
and logical but at this time it is the only approach that
we know of that makes consistent military sense f^6j.
The analyst using QJMA makes some important assumptions.
He assumes that the subjective judgment used by the
historian to convert primary, secondary and tertiary
historical research into properly quantified data was
essentially correct. He accepts an evolutionary view of
combat wh i ch seeks to extend and modify past lessons into
answers to today's and tomorrow's questions. Dupuy
expl a i ned
Nor do many (^analysts]] see--wi thout historical
perspect i ve--that the tremendous changes in weaponry and
equipment which they observe today are (with the possible
exception of nuclear weapons) hardly any more startling
than other technological and weapons developments since
the dawn of the Industrial Revol ut ion. . . The reason for
this is that the principal weapon of war is, and always
has been, man himself. Thus the nature of warfare has
changed only in its details (sometimes dramatically, but
always relatively slowly) as man adapts himself and his
thinking to new weapons and technology ... I n our time there
could be no more striking demonstration of this truism
than the 1973 October War [k7].
The analyst assumes, as does the war game designer, that
history has aggregated for him the myriad of subprocesses in
combat into the key variables. Finally, the analyst accepts
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the many mathematical formula for fusing together the




The author found no one model of combat unconditionally
preferred to another, although his undergraduate training in
mathematics and history and his recreational war gaming led
him to a perhaps unpopular bias in favor of Dupuy's QJMA and
its theory of combat. Although only Dupuy's model
specifically uses the word "judgment/ 1 the survey of methods
for modeling land combat demonstrated that every model
contains enough of the modeler's judgment to make a
decisionmaker (or at least the author) a bit skeptical about
the entire process of attempting to model land combat as if
it were a part of a physical science.
The survey also demonstrated that the analyst need not
be constrained methodologically to only one approach.
Although the user's needs are varied and complex, for both
the firefight and the theater-level war there are micro- and
macro-models which may be applied to the problem.
Two phenomena observed during the research for this
thesis appear to bode we'll for the future of land combat
analysis. One is the wide interest in war gaming. As Dupuy
observed,
Let me also remind both historians and operations
researchers that some of the most serious analyses of
historical conflict are appearing in the periodicals of
the wargames-for-enterta i nment community. Not least is
the fact that at least one commercial manufacturer of such
games has, as a result of the sophistication of its
U7

products/ preformed consulting and developmental services
for the US armed forces 0*8] .
The analyst should remain in touch with this supportive
community's activities.
The second promising note is sounded by the tremendous
(and increasing) power of programmable hand-held
calculators. The program in Appendix B was only one simple
example of what could be done to give the analyst more
freedom to use a variety of tools. The author was confident
that the QJMA could also be so programmed.
Finally/ this survey led the author to the conclusion
that four books form a core of knowledge about the methods
of modeling land combat. They are Taylor's Force-on-Force
Attri tion Model 1 ing / Colonna's CARMOMETTE. Volume I. General
Descr ? pt ion/ Dunnigan's The Complete Wargames Handbook / and
Dupuy's Numbers/ Predictions and War . Their inclusion in the
education of U. S. Army officers and especially operations
research analysts could aid in the pursuit of better answers
to the difficult questions of land combat.
kS

APPENDIX A. MODIFYING THE MANUAL WARGAME "STALINGRAD"
TO REFLECT HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
1. INTRODUCTION
The German invasion of Russia in June 19U1 was a
long-shot gamble that almost succeeded. The ensuing four
years of offensives/ sieges and counter-offensives were
unmatched for their size, duration and scope of heroism.
For military historians this period holds a special
fascination. It was therefore fitting that one of the first
commercially available manual wargames was "Stal i'ngrad" by
Avalon Hill, Inc. Their sales brochure correctly extols
this game: "The perennial favorite at wargaming conventions,
this 'classic' wargame has passed the text of time. For
simplicity of play and excitement level, this 'starter' game
has no equal say knowledgeable aficionados who cut their
teeth on this game way back when..." [ll
In college the author began playing "Stalingrad" and can
attest to that appraisal. Over a period of ten years the
author has played a total of over twenty games against
several opponents and knows the rules, terrain and likely
scenarios well. The best opponent, Captain Chris North, so
thoroughly triumphed initially that the author studied it
intensely, playing solitaire games to gain insight, and
eventually attained near parity with him. It is from these
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experiences that "Stalingrad" was examined in the light of
historical combat data in an attempt to validate the
underlying assumptions of the model.
The historical information was taken from War in the
East / The Russon-German Conflict,, 19^1~U5 by the Staff of
Strategy and Tactics Magazine. The contributors were James
F. Dunnigan / Colonel Trevor Dupuy / David C. Isby / Edward C.
McCarthy and Stephen B. Patrick. Some of the articles
appeared first in the magazine in the early 1970's.
The method of analysis was to compare the actual course
of the war with an "expected value" game between two equal
and competent players. That game existed only in the
author's mind / so the conclusions were subjective. Despite
this, the exercise acted to highlight several key factors in
the modeling of land combat.
Since the game of monthly turns ends in May 1943, the
analysis was restricted to that historical period. That was
a reasonable point for game termination since it
corresponded roughly with the Battle of Kursk, the greatest
tank battle in history, after which the Soviets never lost
the offensive. Significant rule changes would be needed to
model the improved Russian effectiveness and large quantity
Lend-lease and domestically produced supplies, but those
were beyond the scope of this analysis. Rather, the period




2. A SUMMARY OF THE WAR TO MAY 191*3
The attack by German forces against the Soviets at 0300
hours, 22 June 1941, caught the Russian command completely
by surprise. The advances by Army Group North toward
Leningrad and Army Group Center past Minsk toward Smolensk
were devastating and swift beyond belief. In one month's
time the Germans were to the Luga River. While Army Group
South had a slower, tougher fight, it succeeded in taking
Kiev in late September and crossed the Dnepr River. By
December, Army Group Center was exhausted in front of the
gates of Moscow, Army Group North had Leningrad under siege,
and Army Group South had taken Rostov, Stalino, Kharkov and
Kursk, extending to the headwaters of the Don River. The
enormity of the German success was staggering \l, 1>~\,
From December to May 1942, the Soviets counterattacked
the overextended Germans in the center and south. Rostov
was retaken and advances were made in the center, relieving
the pressure on Moscow. The weather, as much as the Russian
combat effectiveness, began to take its toll. "The Germans
had taken some serious blows in the winter but the overall
picture at this time was not a bad one." [h~\
The German Offensive, "Fall Blau," ran from May to
November. It retook only a portion of the center in front
of Moscow and Tula, made no advance on the Leningrad siege,
but scored great success in the south. The Russians were
pushed back to the Don River, lost nine-tenths of
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Sta1ingrad / and were pushed to the Caucasus Mountains.
However, the German 6th Army in Stalingrad was overextended.
The south then collapsed. From November through March
191*3, the Soviets' counterof f ens i ve led to the surrender of
the Germans in Stalingrad and pushed beyond Kursk, Kharkov
and Rostov. The Germans then retook Kharkov but lost some
ground near Leningrad. "Although the Soviet winter
offensive of 19i+2-t*3 began with disaster and the Germans had
lost vast areas of ground, the tactical skill of von
Manstein had salvaged more than just some holding positions
in the south... They had shortened their lines to more
defensible ones and were still able to beat off anything
like a Soviet force of equal size." [5 J In the spring the
Germans concentrated on preparing to retake the Kursk
salient. The actual battle began on 5 July against
tremendous Soviet defenses, achieved penetration but died
when Hitler pulled tank corps out of the campaign for
transfer to Orel to counter a Soviet penetration. From this
time on, the Soviets had the offensive all the way into
Germany.
3. THAT WHICH IS MODELED CORRECTLY
Of the major components of the game, only the Combat
Results Table (CRT) and initial setup of forces in June 19^1
appeared to need modification to bring the game into
historical reality. The omission of air power could have
been incorporated into the CRT and the naval conflict was,
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for the scope of this analysis/ inconsequential. The
possibility of aid to either side from liberated partisans/
primarily in the Ukraine/ was not played although they were
a factor working against the Germans in the war. This
omission was not serious and/ like air power/ could be
factored into the CRT if desired.
The terrain board accurately reflected the area of
operations. It v/as in hexes/ incorporating rail lines/
rivers/ marshes/ mountains/ seas and lakes. Key cities such
as Warsaw/ Kiev/ Smolensk/ Moscow, Leningrad/ Kharkov/
Kursk/ Rostov and Stalingrad were highlighted. Defenders in
the cities were probably correctly doubled in effectiveness.
Lakes and rivers around and north of Leningrad froze in the
winter/ permitting the type of attacks across the ice which
actually occurred. Other terrain effects appeared correctly
modeled: defenders' effectiveness was doubled when in
mountains or behind a river; only three units (corps) could
aggregate in a hex; Hungary was off-limits to the Germans in
the initial invasion; the Pripyat marshes split the invasion
forces into two thrusts.
The modeling of movement was realistic with the
exception of rail movement which none of the authors
directly addressed. The effect of the seasons in Russia
upon movement were pronounced: snow upon all combatants and
mud upon the motorized forces. The rule of halving all
movement in snow and mud months was realistic. The ten hex
rail movement rule v/as unverified as was the reduction to
five hexes in snow. It certainly contributed to a rapid
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German advance in parallel to the actual invasion campaign.
One nuance which could be added would require the opposing
force to travel at regular movement rate over the railroad
when taking it from his enemy. Thereafter it would be
available to him at the full rail movement rate. This would
simulate the engineering required to convert Russian
railroads to German guage and back.
Weather was fixed as clear or snow for all months except
October, Novenber, March and April. For these months, the
German player rolled a die to determine the weather (and
movements rules) for that month's turn. This was a good
rule. Combat effectiveness was not degraded on either side
due to mud or snow. However, a case could be made that the
weather's effect was greater on the German forces than on
the Russian.
Two entire chapters on the order of battle discussed in
detail the size and nature of the forces of both sides. The
sixty-five Axis unit counters and thirty-four Russian unit
counters appeared to represent roughly the number and size
of the various corps-size units. All Russian units were
fifty percent more effective on defense that on offense--a
figure supported by Colonel Dupuy [6]. Armor had a higher
combat power than infantry in proportion to their
"firepower" indices. The translation from paper
organization charts to combat indices on unit counters




None of the authors discussed the Finnish campaign by
the Russians so the appropriateness of the Finnish rules
could not be evaluated. There was a question, though, about
the complete discretion of the Russian player in placing
forces near Leningrad to restrain and destroy the Finns.
This question was related to the initial setup of forces to
be discussed below.
The rules for conducting combat were related to zones of
control exerted by a unit counter and the ability of a side
to mass against one unit while making inferior attacks
against other enemy units in the same or adjoining hexes.
This was a profound insight made by the game's designers,
reflecting the conclusion of F. W. Lanchester's law of
modern warfare: concentration of modern firepower can be
devastating. In the conduct of the game, each player must
weigh both side's ability to mass and destroy key units or
seize key terrain, thereby rendering the front substantially
weaker than a simple numerical comparison of total attacker
to defender firepower scores. In Russia the vastness of the
land gave new definition to the concept of "the front." It
could best be considered as a line of fortified outposts [7j.
The zone of control rule ably modeled this expansive front
concept.
Rapid German advances required the wholesale
destruct ion-i n-place of enemy units and subsequent
penetration. In this game there was no movement after
battle. Given the size of units, one month turns and the
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size of a hex, the rule made sense.
The modeling of replacement unit counters for the German
was accurate. It was a constant rate of four attack factors
per month. There were no extra counters, so that the German
could never have more forces on the playing board that that
with which he began [8 J.
The modeling of Soviet replacements was less certain.
The increase of replacement factors from zero to four to six
to eight reflected the relocation of industry beyond the
front and the seemingly endless supply of manpower in
Russia. The timing of the increases was accurate but the
size of the replacements was in question. It was related to
the CRT and is discussed below.
k. THAT WHICH IS MODELED POORLY
Given the above historical scenario, is it likely that
an "expected value" game of "Stalingrad" among equally
competent players would result in a similar scenario and
outcome? The answer is a resounding no! The German player
simply can not expect to achieve penetrations and advances
comparable to the historical scale. The two key weaknesses
of the game were the Combat Results Table and the initial
setup of forces. The two factors were related.
While the order of battle analysis had correctly sized
the competing forces into corps unit counters with
appropriate firepower indices, the CRT failed to incorporate
the key factor which made the Germans grossly more effective
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than the Russians during this two-year period. "The prime
advantage the Germans had over the Russians lay in the
quality of the German leadership and training and in the
adaptability of their manpower." [_§j In summarizing the war,
Colonel Dupuy highlighted two key factors: "the superb
conbat performance of the German Army, with battlefield
accomplishments probably exceeding the best of any other
army in military hi story ... (and) .. . the seemingly
i nexhaustabl e supply of manpower at the disposal of the
outclassed Soviet commanders." [lOJ
The Russians could not attack as v/ell as the Germans.
"When the Red Army finally turned to the offensive,
commanders were reluctant to concentrate forces for a
penetrat ion . . . The depth of a single thrust was further
limited by the inadequacy of Soviet control and supply
systems." [ll] Another part of this Soviet ineptitude was
revealed in the distinctions between the 1939 and 1943-45
divisions. "Man for man, the December 1942 rifle division
had 64 percent more firepower than the September 1939
division." [12] There was no indication that "Stalingrad's"
designers took these intangible factors into account in the
design of the CRT.
The Germans pioneered in the "combined arms" concept and
achieved unexpected successes due to the synergy of the team
and their skill in execution. The artillery was a key part
of this team. "On paper, the 1943 Soviet rifle battalion
was about equal to the German 1944 battalion in
f i repower . . .What gave the Germans an edge was their numerous
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divisional artillery, which was accustomed to working
closely with the divisional infantry battalions. This was
not the case with the numerous non-divisional artillery
which often worked with Soviet rifle battalions." [lf\
Colonel Dupuy, founder and Executive Director of the
Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO),
concluded that "100 German soldiers were the combat
equivalent of 26^ Russian troops! For 1943 alone the
average German superiority was 148 percent greater than that
of the Russians." [14J Dunnigan confirmed this conclusion
qualitatively: "As infantry alone, the Russian infantry was
much respected by the Germans from the very start of the
war. But as part of a combined arms-team, they never really
got the upper hand over the Germans." JJL5J
The "Stalingrad" CRT underrewarded the German player on
offense, forced him to take too many casualties in
proportion to his monthly replacement rate, and, barring
exceptional luck with the die, doomed the German cause. The
most likely explanation for this failure was the confusion
of similar paper combat organizations with equal combat
effectiveness. "At a glance the German organization doesn't
look much different from that used by its opponents,
particularly the Western Allies. By 1944, this would have
been a valid assessment. But before that, appearances were
deceiving. Other armies had organization which looked
somewhat like the German one but in performance was quite
inferior. The critical factors here v/ere training and, to a
lesser extent, equipment and weapons." JJL63
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The second serious flaw in "Stalingrad" which prevented
the German player from achieving the initial incredible
thrusts lay in the rules governing the initial setup of
forces. An experienced Russian player could deploy his
forces to bottle up the initial German attacks in the north,
center and south. He hid behind rivers, in mountains, and
sacrificed small units to both slow the advances and exacted
precious casualties until replacements began arriving. By
the time the German had broken through Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev
and Riga and was onto the flat, open terrain, he was behind
schedule, bloodied beyond hope of replacement to his initial
strength level and facing a constantly growing Russian
opponent
.
5. CHANGES TO THE GAME TO REFLECT HISTORICAL DATA
Two adjustments to the rules of "Stalingrad" were needed
to permit the "expected value" of the game to more closely
parallel history. These tv/o rule changes were selected from
among many possible combinations because they seemed to be
the most likely to achieve this purpose. The first was to
change the CRT as follows: the German attacks at a ratio of
one greater than the force ratio would indicate, the Russian
attacks at the normal ratios and the die outcomes in the CRT
remain the same. Thus, if the Germans had hi attack factors
against Ik Russian defense factors, the battle was a 4-1
instead of a 3-1.
The second was to initially deny the Russian player one
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of his 7-10-U infantry corps and two cavalry corps--the
6-9-6 and 5-7-6. Their losses would substantially weaken
the initial Russian deployment and, coupled with the CRT
change, would open up the game to the quick advantages the
German should make. These big units, sitting in key cities
and behind key rivers, were the foundation of the bottling
up of Axis forces in the game. These unit counters could be
placed in Finland but could not be released until the Finns
were overcome.
Neither of these rule changes was tried in actual
wargaming since the author had yet to find any opponents.
However, one rule change was routinely played: reducing the
Soviet replacement rate from 4-6-8 defensive factors per
month per city down to 4-5-6. This acted to equalize the
forces and prolonged the German player's agony. Another
rule change which the author had played was to give the
German an initial "surprise" advantage by adding one to the
force ratio, as proposed above. This occurred only on the
first turn but, coupled with the modified replacement rate,
made for a long, toughly fought game. However, the rapid
initial advance still did not occur.
The changes, then, were to increase German combat
effectiveness, restrict Russian initial force deployment,




A careful analysis of campaign information and battle
results can give the military analyst sources by which rough
coefficients of unit combat effectiveness can be derived.
Deviations from parity, as in the dramatic case of German
versus Russian combined arms teams, force closer examination
of the factors contributing to effectiveness and
ineffectiveness. At the micro-level of combat analysis, the
analyst is hard pressed to place a number on intangibles
such as morale, espirit, training, equipment, timeliness of
replacements, level of supplies and maintenance, and so
forth. How much is one more measure of morale worth?
Furthermore, how is the synergy of the combined arms team to
be measured and modeled? Frankly, the author doubted that
any answer could be given at the micro-level of combat
anal ys is.
The insights to be gained from the macro-level of
campaign analysis at such a super-aggregated level as in
"Stalingrad" might be applied to smaller unit battles if
desired. The coefficients for Lanchester-type models of
combat, reflecting relative combat effectiveness, could be
applied (with reservations, of course) to the combat of
smaller units. This top-down solution would not yeild
specific numbers for the intangibles listed above, but may
give a measure to their combination. As such, the use of
historical campaign analysis could aid in our understanding
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APPENDIX B. A SIMPLE HETEROGENEOUS FORCE MODEL PROGRAM
1. INTRODUCTION
The program models a red force of two weapon types
attacking a blue force of two weapon types. It is
implemented on a Texas Instruments Programmable 59
calculator and PC-100C Printer. The user provides the
initial force levels, aggregated attrition-rate
coefficients, forward step-time unit, battle termination
time and printer time increment for printing the force
levels periodically throughout the battle.
This linear model of heterogeneous combat is based upon
equation (6.6.6) of Taylor jj*9j.
dx n
1 \ '
-— = - > ACij)Y(j) with X (0) = X(i0)
dt Z I i
j*l fort*l,2 # ...,m
dy m
- > B(ij)X(j) with Y (0) = Y(i0)
dt Z j Ij=l for i = 1, 2, . . .
n
Here the allocation factor, or fraction of a weapon type
which engaged an opposing weapon type, is combined with the
constant attrition-rate coefficient into one coefficient:
A(ij) or B(ij). When a weapon type is annihilated, its
6U

strength is set to zero automatically and the battle
continues. The program uses the forward finite-difference
approximation method.
2. USER INSTRUCTIONS
Insert the program into calculator memory. Storing the
program on both sides of one magnetic card is recommended.
Press GTO, LMX / and key in the initial force level of blue's
first weapon system X(10) and press R/S. Repeat the process
of keying in the proper number and pressing R/S in the
following sequence: X(20), YUO), Y(20), ACID, A(12),
A(21), A(22), B<11), B(12), B(21), 3(22), step-time,
stop-time, and the number of step-times between each print
cycle. The data has now been entered.
To initialize or reinitialize the calculator, press GTO,
CE, R/S. To execute the program and print the results,
press GTO, 1/X, R/S. The program will stop when stop-time
is reached. The smaller the step-time, the longer the
calculator will spend in execution.
3. DATA REGISTERS
00 X(10) INITIAL FORCE LEVEL - FIRST BLUE WEAPON
01 X(20) INITIAL FORCE LEVEL - SECOND BLUE WEAPON
02 Y(10) INITIAL FORCE LEVEL - FIRST RED WEAPON
03 Y(20) INITIAL FORCE LEVEL - SECOND RED WEAPON
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01* A(ll) COEFFICIENT - BLUE ONE VS RED ONE
05 A(12) COEFFICIENT - BLUE ONE VS RED TWO
06 A(21) COEFFICIENT - BLUE TWO VS RED ONE
07 A(22) COEFFICIENT - BLUE TWO VS RED TWO
II* B(ll) COEFFICIENT - RED ONE VS BLUE ONE
15 B(12) COEFFICIENT - RED ONE VS BLUE TWO
16 B(21) COEFFICIENT - RED TWO VS BLUE ONE
17 B(22) COEFFICIENT - RED TWO VS BLUE TWO
08 STEP-TIME
18 STOP-TIME
30 NUMBER OF STEP-TIMES BETWEEN PRINT CYCLES
09-13, 19-29, 31 ARE WORK REGISTERS
4. PROGRAM LISTING
000 76 LBL 001 23 LNX 002 91 R/S 003 42 STO
004 00 00 005 91 R/S 006 42 STO 007 01 01
008 91 R/S 009 42 STO 010 02 02 Oil 91 R/S
012 42 STO 013 03 03 014 91 R/S 015 42 STO
016 04 04 017 91 R/S 018 42 STO 019 05 05
020 91 R/S 021 42 STO 022 06 06 023 91 R/S
024 42 STO 025 07 07 026 91 R/S 027 42 STO
028 14 14 029 91 R/S 030 42 STO 031 15 15
032 91 R/S 033 42 STO 034 16 16 035 91 R/S
036 42 STO 037 17 17 038 91 R/S 039 42 STO
040 08 08 041 91 R/S 042 42 STO 043 18 18
044 91 R/S 045 42 STO 046 30 30 047 91 R/S
048 76 LBL 049 24 CE 050 43 RCL 051 00 00
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052 U2 STO 053 10 10 051+ 1+3 RCL 055 01 01
056 1+2 STO 057 11 11 058 1+3 RCL 059 02 02
060 1*2 STO 061 12 12 062 1+3 RCL 063 03 03
061* 1+2 STO 065 13 13 066 1+3 RCL 067 03 08
068 1+2 STO 069 29 29 070 1+2 STO 071 31 31
072 1+3 RCL 073 30 30 071+ 1+2 STO 075 09 09
076 91 R/S 077 76 LBL 078 35 1/X 079 1+3 RCL
080 10 10 081 1+2 STO 082 24 21+ 033 1+3 RCL
034 12 12 085 1+2 STO 086 26 26 087 1+3 RCL
088 13 13 089 1+2 STO 090 28 28 091 1+3 RCL
092 01+ 01+ 093 1+2 STO 091+ 25 25 095 1+3 RCL
096 05 05 097 1+2 STO 098 27 .27 099 71 SBR
100 52 EE 101 1+3 RCL 102 19 19 103- 1+2 STO
iaif 20 20 105 1+3 RCL 106 11 11 107 1+2 STO
108 21+ 21+ 109 1+3 RCL 110 06 06 111 1+2 STO
112 25 25 113 1+3 RCL 111+ 07 07 115 1+2 STO
115 27 27 117 71 SBR 118 52 EE 119 1+3 RCL
120 19 19 121 1+2 STO 122 21 21 123 1+3 RCL
12«* 12 12 125 1+2 STO 126 21+ 21+ 127 1+3 RCL
128 10 10 129 1+2 STO 130 26 26 131 1+3 RCL
132 11 11 133 1+2 STO 131+ 28 28 135 1+3 RCL
136 11+ 11+ 137 1+2 STO 138 25 25 139 1+3 RCL
140 15 15 li+l 1+2 STO 11+2 27 27 11+3 71 SBR
Ikk 52 EE 11+5 1+3 RCL 11+6 19 19 11+7 1+2 STO
1U8 22 22 11+9 1+3 RCL 150 13 13 151 1+2 STO
152 21+ 21+ 153 1+3 RCL 151+ 16 16 155 1+2 STO
156 25 25 157 1+3 RCL 158 17 17 159 1+2 STO
160 27 27 161 71 SBR 162 52 EE 163 1+3 RCL
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161+ 19 19 165 1*2 STO 166 23 23 167 1+3 RCL
168 20 20 169 1*2 STO 170 10 10 171 k3 RCL
172 21 21 173 1*2 STO 17i* 11 11 175 1+3 RCL
176 22 22 177 1*2 STO 178 12 12 179 1+3 RCL
180 23 23 181 1*2 STO 182 13 13 183 1+3 RCL
181+ 31 31 185 32 X-T 186 1*3 RCL 187 18 18
188 77 GE 189 31* X*.5 190 91 R/S 191 76 LBL
192 3k X*.5 193 00 191* 32 X-T 195 1+3 RCL
196 08 08 197 i+i* SUM 198 31 31 199 97 DSZ
200 09 09 201 35 1/X 202 61 GTO 203 k5 Y X
20U 76 LBL 205 52 EE 206 53 ( 207 1+3 RCL
208 2k 2k 209 75 - 210 1*3 RCL 211 25 25
212 65 X 213 1*3 RCL 211* 26 26 215 65 X
216 1+3 RCL 217 29 29 218 75 - 219 1+3 RCL
220 27 27 221 65 X 22 1+3 RCL 223 28 28
221+ 65 X 225 1*3 RCL 226 29 29 227 51+ )
228 kl STO 229 19 19 230 77 GE 231 91+ /-
232 00 233 1*2 STO 231* 19 19 235 76 LBL
236 91* /- 237 92 RTN 238 76 LBL 239 1+5 Y X
2W 1+3 RCL 2U1 10 10 21*2 99 PRT 21+3 1+3 RCL
2kk 11 11 2U5 99 PRT 21+6 1*3 RCL 21+7 12 12
2**8 99 PRT 21*9 1*3 RCL 250 13 13 251 99 PRT
252 1*3 RCL 253 31 31 251* 99 PRT 255 93 ADV
256 1*3 RCL 257 30 30 258 1+2 STO 259 09 09




1. Kapper, F. B., "Theater-Level Gaming in the Formulation
of Plans and Policies (JCS)," in Theater-Level Gaming and
Analysis Workshop for Force Plann i ng, Vol ume I -Proceed i ngs ,
pp. 19-21/ Office of Naval Research, 1977.
2. Brewer/ Gary D. and Shubick/ Martin/ The War Game, A
Critique of Military Problem Solving / pp. 160-180, Harvard
University Press, 1979.
3. Payne, W. B., "Keynote Address/' in Mill tary Strategy
and Tactics, Computer Modeling of Land War Problems, edited
by Huber, R. K., Jones/ L. F. and Reine/ E./ pp. 9-12/
Plenum Press/ 1975.
k. Morris, William T., "On the Art of Modeling,"
Management Science 13 , pp. B707-8717, August 1967.
5. Honig, J., et al , Review of Selected Army Models , p.
I-B-4/ U. S. Army Models Review Committee/ May 1971.
6. Brewer and Shubick/ ibid./ p. 1^8.
7. Dupuy/ T. N./ Numbers, Predictions and War: Using
History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcomes
of Battles , Bobbs-Merri 1 1 , 1979.
8. Honig/ ibid./ p. I-B-5.
9. Colonna/ Gary S., et al/ CARMONETTE . Volume i. General
Descr ipt ion / General Research Corporation/ 197^.
10. Wallace/ William S. and Hagewood/ Eugene G./ Simulat ion
of Tactical Alternative Responses (STAR) / M. S. Thesis/
Naval Postgraduate School/ Monterey/ California/ 1978.
11. Caldwell/ William J. and Meiers/ William D., An Ai r to
Ground and Ground to Air Combined Arms Combat Simulation
(STAR-AIR) , M. S. Thesis/ Naval Postgraduate School/
Monterey/ California/ 1979.
12. Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report
NPS55-79-018/ Parametric Terrain and Line of Sight Modelling
jn the STAR Combat Model / by James K. Hartman, August 1979.
13. Parry/ Samuel H., "STAR: Simulation of Tactical
Alternative Responses/" 1978 Winter Simulation Conference
Proceedings
, pp. 563-69, Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers, December 1978.
69

3.1*. U. S. Army Material Development and Readiness Command,
DARCOM Pamphlet 706-101. Engineering Design Handbook, Army
Weapon Systems Analysis, Part One , November 19 77.
15. Marshall, S. L. A., Men Against Fire, The Problem of
Battle Command in Future War
, p. 50, William Morrow, 1947.
16. Fishman, George S., Principles of Discrete Event
Simulat ion
, pp. 4-7, John Wiley, 1978.
17. Taylor, James G., Lanchester-Type Models of Warfare ,
Chapter 2, Office of Naval Research, to be published.
18. Taylor, James G., Force-on-Force Attrition Modeling
,
pp. 23-35, Operations Research of America, 1979
.
19. Taylor, Force-on-Force Attrition Modeling , pp. 75-82.
20. Bonder, Seth, "An Overview of Land Battle Modeling in
the U. S.," pp. 73-88, Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual
U. S. Army Operations Research Symposium , Fort Lee,
Virginia, 1974.
21. Bonder, Seth, "Combat Model," Chapter 2 in Xhe Tank
Weapon System, Report No. RF 573 AR 64-1 (U) , Systems
Research Group, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio,
June 1964.
22. Bonder, Seth, "A Theory for Weapon System Analysis,"
pp. 111-128, Proceedings of the Fourth Annual U. S. Army
Operations Research Symposium, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama,
1965.
23. Bonder, Seth, "The Lanchester Attrition-Rate
Coefficient," Operations Research, v. 15
, pp. 221-232, 1967.
24. Marshall, ibid., p. 39.
25. Weapons Systems Evaluation Group Report WSEG-2,
VECTOR-0, The 3attle Model Prototype: Summary and
Descr i pt ion, Arlington, Virginia, 1973.
26. Fishman, ibid, pp. 120-122.
27. Clark, Gordon M., The Combat Analysis Model , Ph. D.
thesis, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 1969.
28. Taylor, James G., Lanchester-Type Models, p. 5.15-2.
29. Clark, ibid., p. 238.
30. Brewer and Shubick, ibid., p. 39.
70

31. Dunnigan, James F., "Part 8. Designing Games (Plus a
Complete Wargame— The Drive on Metz: 19i*i*)," The Complete
Wargames Handbook ,, to be published.
32. Quade, E. S., Analysis for Public Decisions / pp.
199-211, Elsevier, 1975.
33. Owen, Guillermo, Game Theory , p. 31, W. B. Saunders,
1963.
3U. Taylor, Force-on-Force Attrition Modeling
, p. 9.
35. Hausrath, Alfred H., Venture Simulation in War ,
Business, and Politics, pp. 152-137, McGraw-Hill, 1971.
36. General Accounting Office, Models, Data and War; A
Critique of the Foundation for Defense Analyses, pp.
120-130, Government Printing Office, 1980.
37. Bode, John, "Problems of Aggregation and Resolution in
Theater-Level Models," in Theater-Level Gaming, pp. 61-72.
38. Honig, ibid., p. I-B-3.
39. Dare, David P., "On a Hierarchy of Models," in
Operat ionsanal yt i sche Spiel fur die Vertei d i gung, pp.
285-307, Huber, R. K., Niemeyer, K., and Hofmann, H. W.
editors, Oldenbourg Verlag, Munchen, 1979.
40. Dupuy, ibid., p. 32.
1*1. Dupuy, ibid., pp. 50, 56.
1*2. Dupuy, ibid., pp. 95-110.
1*3. Dupuy, T. N., "Predicting the Element of Surprise in
Combat," Army , pp. 1*4-51, May 1977.
1*1*. Dupuy, Numbers
, p. 139.
1*5. Dupuy, Numbers , p. 150.










1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 2 23 1^
2. Library, Code 011+2 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Department Chairman, Code 55 1
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9391+0
4. Professor James G. Taylor, Code 55Tw 50
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Captain William Ted Farmer 2
201 Glenwood Circle, Apt. 8-C
Monterey, California 93940
6. Professor James K. Hartman, Code 55Hh 10
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
7. Professor S. H. Parry, Code 55Py 10
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
8. LTC Edward P. Kelleher, Code 55Ka 10
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940




10. Office of the Commanding General 1
U. S. Army TRADOC
ATTN: General Donn A. Starry
Ft. Monroe, Virginia 23651
11. Headquarters 1
U. S. Army Training & Doctrine Command
ATTN: ATCG-T (Col. Scribner)




U. S. Army Training & Doctrine Command
ATTN: Director Analysis Directorate
Combat Developments (MAJ Chris Needels)
Ft. Monroe/ Virginia 23651
13. Headquarters
U. S. Army Training & Doctrine Command
ATTN: Director/ Maneuver Directorate
Combat Developments (Col. Fred Franks)
Ft. Monroe/ Virginia 23651
Ik. Mr. David Hardison
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army
(Operations Research)
Department of the Army, The Pentagon
Washington/ D. C. 20310
15. LTG William Richardson
Commanding General
U. S. Army Combined Arms Center
Ft. Leavenworth/ Kansas 66027
16. Di rector
Combined Arms Combat Development Activity
ATTN: Col. Reed
Ft. Leavenworth/ Kansas 66027
17. Director/ BSSD
Combined Arms Training Development Actiivity
ATTN: ATZLCA-DS
Ft. Leavenworth/ Kansas 66027
18. Director
Combat Analysis Office
ATTN: Mr. Kent Pickett
U. S. Army Combined Arms Center
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
19. Command and General Staff College
ATTN: Education Advisor
Room 123/ Bell Hall
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
20. Dr. Wilbur Payne/ Director
U. S. Army TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico 38002
21. Headquarters, Department of the Army
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Plans
ATTN: DAM0-2D




U. S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency
8120 Woodmont Avenue
ATTN: MOCA-SMS (CPT Steve Shupack)
8ethesda / Maryland 20014
23. Commander
U. S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency
ATTN: MOCA-WG (LTC Earl Darden)
8120 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda / Maryland 20014
24. Director
U. S. Army Night Vision & Electro-optical Lab.
ATTN: DEL-NV-VI -Mr. Bob Hermes
Ft. Belvoi r, Virginia 22060
25. Director
U. S. Army Material Sustems Analysis Activity
ATTN: Mr. Will Brooks
Aberdeen Proving Grounds/ Maryland 21005
26. Director
Combat Developments Experimentation Command
ATTN: CPT William J. Caldwell
Ft. Ord, California 93941
27. Director
Armored Combat Vehicle Technology Program
ATTN: Col. Fitzmorris
U. S. Army Armor Center
Ft. Knox/ Kentucky 40121
28. Col . Frank Day
TRADOC Systems Manager - XM1
U. S. Army Armor Center
Ft. Knox/ Kentucky 40121
29. Director
Combat Developments/ Studies Division
ATTN: MAJ W. Scott Wallace
U. S. Army Armor Agency
Ft. Knox, Kentucky 40121
30. Commandant
U. S. Army Field Artillery School
ATTN: ATSF-MBT (CPT Steve Starner)
Ft. Sill/ Oklahoma 73503
31. Director/ Combat Developments
ATTN: Col. Clark Burnett
U. S. Army Aviation Agency





U. S. Army Infantry School
Ft. Benning / Georgia 31905
33. Commander / Ml COM
ATTN: DRSMI-YC (CPT Hagewood)
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809
34. D i rector
Combat Developments
ATTN: CPT William D. Meiers
U. S. Army Air Defense Agency
Ft. Bliss, Texas 79905
35. Commander
U. S. Army Logistics Center
ATTN: ATCL-OS-Mr. Cammeron/CPT Schuessler
Ft. Lee, Virginia 23801
36. Commander, USAMMCS
ATTN: ATSK-CD-CS-Mr. Lee/Mr. Marmon
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809
37. Commander
U. S. Army Combined Arms Center
ATTN: ATZL-CA-CAT (R. E. DeKinder, Jr.)
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
38. Director
U. S. Army AMSAA
ATTN: DRXSY-AA (Mr. Tom Coyle)
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland 21005
39. R. Stampfel, Code 55





Mr. James F. Dunnigan
Simulations Publications, Inc.
257 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10010
41. Colonel T. N. Dupuy
Historical Evaluation and Research Organization
P. 0. 3ox 157
Dunn Loring, Virginia 22027
42. Professor Ira Gruber
History Department





TRADOC Research Element Monterey
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
44. CAPT Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Code 55H1 15








Center for Advanced Research
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02850
47. Director 2
Center for War Gaming
U. S. Naval War College













c.l A survey of approaches




^..•'.•/V.'.v.'i' I > v ,;'
!OTl
. V : , 1/>••..;•
